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The current crisis has clearly shown the need to deepen our understanding of the linkages 
between macroeconomic and financial variables. Indeed, the science of economics has 
been accused of being incapable of predicting the crisis, even though apparently unsus-
tainable imbalances were building up during the preceding expansionary phase. In par-
ticular, there have been many references to rapid credit growth and how it has caused 
upward pressure on assets, particularly real estate. As a result of this experience, mecha-
nisms to predict the economic cycle are currently being proposed that are based on using 
credit as a “leading variable” for the cycle, in other words, as an indicator containing infor-
mation predicting the likelihood of a recession. It is also increasingly common for macro-
economic supervision by international institutions to use credit growth as a signal of mac-
roeconomic imbalances or as a warning sign of future recessions.
However, the statistical basis for this type of inference draws on studies carried out since 
the start of the current crisis. This work by both academics and analysts examines the 
behaviour of the economy drawing on the information available at each point in time, 
which is used to attempt to describe the past. It is a different question whether the infor-
mation available at each point is time can predict the future, or, other words, what varia-
bles in real-time economic prediction models contain predictive information allowing turn-
ing points in the economic cycle to be detected.
In this paper we present a summary of recent work addressing this issue. Specifically, our 
study aimed to determine whether, with the information available at a given moment in the 
expansionary phase prior to the crisis, it would have been possible to make a clear diag-
nosis of the economy’s situation at that time. And, above all, it asks whether changes in 
any of the financial variables (credit, in particular) would have been a useful predictor of the 
onset of recession.1 This paper starts by describing the combined evolution of credit and 
the economic cycle in several countries over the last few decades, and highlighting a num-
ber of empirical studies that have sought to base economic predictions on this informa-
tion. It then discusses the origin of the difficulties involved in using credit as a leading in-
dicator of the cycle, and puts forward an alternative methodological approach for the use 
of financial variables in models predicting the economic cycle.
Chart 1, plotting the ratio of bank credit2 to GDP in the United States, clearly shows the 
association between the economic cycle and changes in the amount of credit. In the U.S. 
case, since 1960 an expansion of credit can be observed just prior to each recession.3 
Moreover this regularity is not limited to the United States. Using a sample of 39 OECD 
countries, Gadea and Pérez Quirós (2012) have shown that, over the period between the 
first quarter of 1950 and the second quarter of 2011, credit performed in this way during 
expansions in all the developed economies. What is more, many theoretical models indi-
cate that it is an intrinsic feature of the cycle that credit should grow endogenously with 
Introduction
Credit and the economic 
cycle
1  See Gadea and Pérez Quirós (2012). 
2  We refer in particular to the “Claims on private sector of depositary corporations” series in the IMF’s Interna-
tional Financial Statistics.
3  The recessions on the chart have been dated using the NBER methodology.
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expansions.4 This regularity underlies recent empirical work seeking to identify a causal 
relationship between credit growth and the likelihood of a recession.5
All these studies have concluded that the change in the credit-to-GDP ratio is a particu-
larly robust variable with which to predict future recessions. Nevertheless, the studies 
backing this conclusion do not always agree on which comparison of credit and GDP 
contains most information about the cycle. Thus, some studies [e. g., Gourinchas and 
Obstfeld (2011)] have used the level of the credit to GDP ratio [e. g., Jordá et al. (2011a) 
and IMF (2011)] have opted for the change in the credit-to-GDP ratio, while others have 
used what they have called a “credit intensity” indicator, which represents the cumulative 
value of the difference between the credit and GDP growth rates since the last recession 
[e. g., Jordá et al. (2011b)]. These are all variables that grow systematically during periods 
of expansion.
Where these studies agree is on the methodological approach used. Basically, the aim is 
to characterise the statistical relationship between one variable (i.e. “recession”) which 
takes a value 1 in period “t” if there is a recession (exogenously defined) between periods 
t + 1 and t + 3, and 0 in all other periods, and the variable chosen to characterise credit 
performance, while controlling for the possible effects of a set a other variables that, like 
the credit variable, are dated at the current time, “t.”6 In all the studies cited, a positive and 
statistically significant relationship is obtained between credit and the variable represent-
ing the occurrence of a recession, and given this result, the economic policy implication is 
that credit growth has to be controlled in order to reduce the likelihood of a recession.
Although the foregoing results may seem clear cut, before basing economic policy on 
them the following points – at least – should be taken into account:
a) Descriptive analysis should not be confused with statistical inference. Taking 
recessions as an “exogenous” event and analysing how certain macroeco-
nomic and financial variables behave around the time of their occurrence is 
not the same thing as establishing a causal relationship. For example, there 
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VARIATION IN CREDIT AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP IN THE UNITED STATES CHART 1
4  See Gertler and Karadi (2011), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2010), and Nuño and 
Thomas (2012), among others.
5  See, for example, IMF (2011), Schularick and Taylor (2009), Jordá et al. (2011a and b), Gourinchas and Obstfeld 
(2011) and Claessens et al. (2011a and b).
6  Formally, this is a logit model.
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have been episodes of rapid credit growth that have not ended in a recession, 
such as in the nineteen eighties and nineties, and again in the early 2000s.7
b) Including a variable with a trend, such as credit levels or the ratio of credit to 
GDP, in an econometric model can throw up spurious statistical associations.
c) Given that variables relating to credit are used to define periods of recession, 
when the recession variable is regressed against credit, the latter is not exog-
enous. The results of the estimate are therefore skewed upwards and the re-
lationship between credit and future recessions is not captured correctly.
d) Finally, the findings regarding the association between credit growth and the 
occurrence of recessions are skewed by the latest recession, which has fi-
nancial origins. Before this episode, very rarely did any country in the OECD 
show such a close relationship. Therefore, it would not have been possible to 
establish a stable relationship between the financial sector and the real econ-
omy prior to 2007.  Accordingly, most macroeconomic models did not include 
these financial variables because this strong relationship between the real 
and financial worlds did not exist in the data.
To illustrate this point, it is worth looking at some merely descriptive findings from the 
sample of OECD countries studied by Gadea and Pérez Quirós (2012). In this sample 149 
recessions can be identified, of which only 45 coincide with one of the financial crises 
documented by Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2011). For their part, Gourinchas and Obstfeld 
(2011) identify 143 financial crises, of which only 45 coincide with recessions dated as 
such. What is more, of these 45 recessions that do coincide with financial crises, 31 are 
observed after 2007, with only 14 occurring before 2007. Thus, if the question as to the 
relationship between financial crises and recessions had been asked in 2007, there would 
only have been evidence of a coincidence in 14 cases in the sample of 230 occurrences of 
recessions (230 = 149 – 31 real world crises + 143 – 31 financial crises). In other words, a 
coincidence between recession and financial crisis would have been detected in just 6% 
of cases. This is an association that is obviously too weak for any statistical analysis to 
have detected it as significant.
In short, it may be concluded that prior to the outbreak of the latest crisis there was no 
clear evidence of a connection between financial crises and recessions. And even now, 
after all that has happened, the techniques of econometric analysis are unable to reveal a 
clear causal relationship between these two variables such as would allow us to infer in-
formation about the probability of a future recession from one of them (credit).
For the purposes of economic prediction and the design of macroeconomic stabilisation 
policies, the relevant question is not whether there is a statistical association between credit 
and the occurrence of recessions, but whether, given the way credit is evolving at any mo-
ment in time, it is possible to infer anything about the future probability of a recession in the 
subsequent period and about the characteristics of that recession. To answer this question 
we need a real-time predictive model which shows credit’s predictive capacity.
Is it possible to use credit 
as a leading indicator
of the economic cycle?
7  To use a medical analogy, considering only the recessions observed is like conducting a pathological examina-
tion of recessions rather than a clinical medical analysis: the fact that a particular feature has been identified in a 
patient prior to his or her death does not mean that this feature was the cause of death or that all patients shar-
ing this feature will die.
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We use one of the most standard models in the literature – Hamilton’s Markov Chain model 
(1989) – to describe recessions and expansions in real time.  This model considers the GDP 
growth rate to fluctuate around two different values according to whether the economy is in 
expansion or recession. To capture the momentum of recessions and expansions, their 
dynamics are also considered to follow a Markov Chain process, such that there is a con-
stant probability (p) that an expansion will be followed by another expansion and a constant 
probability (q) that a recession will be followed by another recession. In this context, if 
credit is really able to predict the occurrence and nature of recessions, a statistically sig-
nificant relationship should be found between the GDP growth rate and credit, or between 
the probabilities just described (p, q) and credit, i.e. that credit should affect either the ex-
pected growth rate in recessions and expansions (or the amplitude of recessions and ex-
pansions, which amounts to the same thing) or the probability of exiting these periods (or, 
in other words, the expected duration of recessionary and expansionary periods).8
Given that the number of recessions observed in each country is small (eight, for example, in 
the United States), the foregoing model’s estimate for each country in isolation is insuffi-
ciently powerful to enable confirmation of the hypothesis of credit’s predictive capacity, in 
particular, as regards its ability to predict the probability of entering into recession. It is there-
fore necessary to mix recessions and use the relationship between credit and the cycle at 
each point in time in all the economies in the sample. To do so, various statistical procedures 
have been designed that use information from other countries in order to infer the occurrence 
of a recession in the country in question.9 With these procedures, in the case of certain coun-
tries the description of the turning points improves substantially with respect to the univariant 
per-country model, and in others they coincide almost precisely. In the case of the United 
States the probability of recession on the two methods – that using only data on the United 
States and that which uses aggregate data – offer a similar profile, basically describing reces-
sions reported by the NBER. In the cases of France and Spain, the one-country model ex-
plains the recessions obtained by the standard cyclically dated descriptive methods very 
poorly, whereas the predictive power of the model combining countries, by contrast, is such 
that it yields much better descriptions of the crises (see Chart 2).  Using the aggregate data 
from all the economies, the method combining information explains each country’s future 
recessions better, and this improvement is statistically significant.10
The best model being that which combines information from various countries, it was in this 
model that credit was introduced into the estimate of the GDP growth rate and the probabili-
ties of a transition between expansion and recession. The results suggest that credit affects 
both the scale of growth in the expansions and recessions, as well as the probability of re-
maining in a particular state (see Table 1). Nevertheless, this result has to be treated with 
caution. Firstly, using the data for the period up to 2007 these coefficients are not significant, 
which indicates that it is a phenomenon associated only with this latest recession. Secondly, 
trying to use this model to predict future recessions and expansions – or the characteristics 
 8  Formally the model would be: t = t, St + et where t is the GDP growth rate, and
   E (t / CRt–1) = 1 + 1 CRt–1. If the economy is expanding
   E (t / CRt–1) = 0 + 0 CRt–1. If the economy is in recession
   pt = p + d1 CRt–1
   qt = q + d0 CRt–1
    where CRt–1 is the level of credit in period t-1. Credit will have information value if the alpha or delta parameters 
are significant.
 9  For more details, see Gadea and Pérez Quirós (2012). A Bayesian interpretation of this approach is that a uni-
variant model is estimated for each period for country by imposing a set of priors associated with the average 
behaviour of these coefficients in the rest of the economies, in order to reduce the standard deviations and so 
be able to make an inference using a more powerful test.
10  The p-value of the Diebold and Mariano test (1996) is 0.00.
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of the economic cycle – yields no improvement on predictions in years outside the sample. 
Lastly, the estimated coefficients are not robust when the duration of the recession or expan-
sion (a standard variable in this type of model) is introduced as an explanatory variable.
One consequence of the recent financial crisis and its considerable negative impacts on 
the real economy has been the call for more attention to be paid to financial variables in 
economic forecasts and when macroeconomic stabilisation policies are contemplated. 
Specifically, credit growth has been singled out as a harbinger of future recession and 
Conclusion
SOURCES: IMF and NBER.
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numerous recent studies have tried to identify an underlying causal relationship between 
credit growth and the occurrence of a recession. In the macroeconomic supervision exer-
cises undertaken by international institutions, more and more attention is being paid to 
how credit is evolving and early-warning mechanisms are being considered in which this 
variable plays an important role.
Nevertheless, the foundations on which the causal relationship between credit and the oc-
currence of recessions is based are somewhat weak. This paper has set out a number of 
points concerning the interpretation of the statistical association between credit and reces-
sion, and has put forward an alternative approach which, by overcoming some the techni-
cal limitations of earlier studies, yields results suggesting that the relationship between 
credit and the occurrence of recessions, if it exists, is very weak, although it has material-
ised in the latest recession. This raises doubts about its possible use in the design of eco-
nomic policy, and at the very least, suggests that there are no grounds for introducing 
credit as an explanatory variable in models predicting turning points in the economic cycle. 
In short, the empirical evidence – particularly that existing in 2007 – offers only limited sup-
port for the idea that economists’ ignorance of the consequences of credit on the eco-
nomic cycle might have had an important role their failure to anticipate the current crisis.
17.12.2012.
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